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Abstract
We consider the one-warehouse multiple retailer inventory model with a submodu-
lar joint setup cost function. The objective of this model is to determine an inventory
replenishment policy that minimizes the long-run average system cost over an infinite
time horizon. Although the optimal policy for this problem is still unknown, a class of
easy-to-implement power-of-two policies are 98% effective. This paper focuses on how
the cost, under an optimal power-of-two policy, should be allocated to the retailers.
This question generates an interesting cooperative game. We prove that this coopera-
tive game has a non-empty core. The key to our result is a strong duality theorem for
the one-warehouse multiple retailer problem under power-of-two policies.
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1 Introduction
In the well-known one-warehouse multiple retailer model, constant customer demand occurs
at each retailer over an infinite time horizon. The retailers place orders to the warehouse to
satisfy customer demands without shortages or backlogging. These orders generate demand
at the warehouse, which holds inventory and is replenished from an external supplier. For
simplicity, we call the warehouse and the retailers facilities. There are two types of costs: A
holding cost charged against each unit of inventory per unit time at each facility, and a setup
cost charged against each order that is a submodular function of the set of facilities that
places the order together. The lead times are assumed to be zero, i.e., orders are delivered
instantaneously. The goal is to find an inventory replenishment policy for the system to
minimize the long-run average cost over an infinite time horizon. This optimization problem
and its variants have been studied extensively in the literature.
In this paper, we assume that the retailers belong to different firms. They cooperate
by sharing a warehouse and by placing joint orders so as to reduce holding and setup costs.
Hence, an important question arises: Once the (joint) optimization problem has been solved,
how should the optimal system-wide cost be allocated among the retailers? The cost should
be allocated in a way that every retailer (and every subset of retailers) would benefit from
the cooperation. That is, no retailer would be better off by deviating from the coalition.
Therefore, cost allocation schemes may have direct consequences on the stability of the
coalition.
The cost allocation problem can be naturally modeled as a cooperative game. One
solution concept of cooperative game theory, called the core, is closely related to the stability
of the coalition. In what follows we study the conditions under which the cooperative game
associated with the one-warehouse multiple retailer model has a non-empty core.
1.1 Literature Review
There has been a steadily increasing stream of research in applying cooperative game theory
to problems related to inventory management. One type of cooperative game concerns
inventory centralization under demand uncertainty. In this setting, a set of retailers, who
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face random demands of a single product, place a joint order before observing the demands in
order to take advantage of the so-called risk-pooling effect. After the demands are realized,
the inventory is optimally allocated to the retailers. It has been shown that the inventory
centralization game has a non-empty core; see Hartman et al. [10] and Mu¨ller et al. [14].
More general models are studied by Slikker et al. [21], and Chen and Zhang [3].
A second type of inventory game has been studied by van den Heuvel et al. [24], Chen
and Zhang [4], and Guardiola et al. [9]. The underlying optimization problem in such a game
is the (deterministic) economic lot sizing (ELS) problem. In this setting, retailers can place
joint orders in order to reduce setup costs. Van den Heuvel et al. [24] consider the most
basic ELS game where backorders are not allowed, and show that the core is non-empty.
Guardiola et al. [9] study the case when backorders are allowed, and show how to find a core
allocation. Chen and Zhang [4] assume that the ordering cost is a general concave function
of the order quantity, and suggest a duality approach to find a core allocation. The model
studied in [4] allows backorders as well.
Our paper deals with the third type of inventory game, which concerns the cost allocation
problem for an infinite time horizon joint replenishment model. In particular, this paper is
closely related to Anily and Haviv [1]. Their model is essentially the same as ours with two
key differences. In their model, the warehouse does not hold any inventory. Furthermore, the
joint setup cost has a special structure called the first-order interaction. In this structure,
a major setup cost is incurred for each order, which is independent of the set of retailers
that places the order. In addition, a minor setup cost is incurred for each retailer that is
included in the joint order. Yet, the optimal policy for the joint replenishment problem with
first order interaction is unknown. Anily and Haviv [1] focus, therefore, on a class of easy-
to-implement policies, called power-of-two policies, because it is well-known that optimal
power-of-two policies are 98% effective; see Roundy [18] and Jackson et al. [11]. Anily and
Haviv show that under the optimal power-of-two policy, the cooperative game associated
with the joint replenishment model with first-order interaction is concave and thus has a
non-empty core.
Meca et al. [13] study a special case of Anily and Haviv’s model [1]. In the special case,
all the minor setup costs are assumed to be zero. Therefore it is always optimal for all the
retailers to order together. In a recent paper, Dror and Hartman [5] study the same model
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as Anily and Haviv [1], but their focus is mainly on characterizing a necessary and sufficient
condition, under which it is optimal for all the retailers to order together and the game to
have a non-empty core.
Applications of game theory in analyzing cooperations among supply chain agents can
be found in Anupindi et al. [2], Granot and Sosˇic´, [8], and Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ [15]. For an
excellent comprehensive review, see Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ [16].
1.2 Our Results and Approach
In this paper, we show that under power-of-two policies, the joint replenishment game with
a submodular joint setup cost function has a non-empty core, even when the warehouse is
allowed to hold inventory. We also show that a special case of this game is concave, which
generalizes one of the main results of Anily and Haviv [1].
We would like to point out that the concavity proof in [1] is tailored to the game with
first order interaction. Therefore, as mentioned in [1], in order to prove the non-emptiness
of the core for the joint replenishment game with a submodular joint setup cost function,
new techniques have to be developed.
We take, therefore, a completely different approach, namely, a duality approach. We
start by formulating the optimization problem, which aims to find the optimal power-of-two
policy for the joint replenishment problem. Then we develop a Lagrangian dual of this non-
convex optimization problem. We find there is no duality gap between the Lagrangian dual
and the original problem. Also, we observe that the dual variables have interesting inter-
pretations. They indicate how the submodular joint setup cost should be divided among
the retailers and the warehouse, and how the warehouse cost should be shared by the retail-
ers. Based on these interpretations, we propose an allocation of the system-wide cost and
show that the allocation is in the core of the associated cooperative game. This gives us a
constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core.
We also demonstrate that for the special case studied in [1], the corresponding La-
grangian dual problem admits a closed-form solution. This might be of interest on its own.
Duality approaches have been quite successful in analyzing cooperative games since the
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seminal work of Owen [17], who used linear programming duality to show the non-emptiness
of the core for the (deterministic) linear production game. One key advantage of this duality
approach is that it gives a constructive proof for the non-emptiness of the core. Although
simple, the linear production game is general enough to cover a number of cooperative games
such as minimum spanning tree games, flow games, discrete location games (on tree graphs),
etc.; see, for instance, Tamir [22]. Thus, Owen’s duality approach applies to such games as
well. For the linear production game, the relationship between the allocations defined by
optimal dual solutions and the core is studied by Samet and Zemel [19]. Granot [7] extends
Owen’s approach to a more general linear production game.
In the area of inventory management, Chen and Zhang [3] apply stochastic programming
duality to a class of general inventory centralization games, and suggest a way to find core-
allocations. In another paper, Chen and Zhang [4] apply linear programming duality to
economic lot sizing games with concave ordering cost. In both papers [3, 4], the dual variables
are interpreted as the price of the demand per unit, and the cost allocations to the retailers
are proportional to their demands.
In contrast, the way we formulate the dual of the joint replenishment problem suggest
a different interpretation of the dual variables. Such an interpretation is meaningful for the
problem of interest, and leads to at least one of the core-allocations.
Finally, we mention that linear programming duality has been used to design polynomial
time approximation algorithms for several (discrete time) inventory models; see, e.g., Levi
et al. [12].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the one-
warehouse multiple retailer model and the cooperative game associated with it. In Section
3, a strong duality theorem is developed for the one-warehouse multiple retailer problem.
We then propose a class of core-allocations for the cooperative game in Section 4. Special
cases of the game are studied in Section 5. We then conclude the paper and suggest areas
for further study.
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2 The Model and the Game
In this section, we first present the infinite-horizon joint replenishment model. In this model,
we are given a set of n retailers, denoted by N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. The demand that retailer
i faces is continuous and deterministic at a fixed rate di > 0. The retailers place orders
to a single warehouse to satisfy customer demands. These orders generate demands at the
warehouse, which holds inventory and is replenished from an external supplier. Backlog-
ging is not allowed in this model. The lead time is assumed to be zero, i.e., orders arrive
instantaneously.
For ease of presentation, the warehouse is denoted by 0. Also, any i ∈ N ∪ {0} is called
a facility, i.e., a facility can be a warehouse or a retailer.
For each i ∈ N ∪ {0}, there is a per unit holding cost rate hi. For simplicity we denote,
Hi =
1
2
hidi and H
w
i =
1
2
h0di, for each i ∈ N . We also assume that 0 < h0 < hi and thus
0 < Hwi < Hi, for any i ∈ N . This assumption is common in the literature; see, e.g., Schwarz
[20], Roundy [18], and Federgruen et al. [6].
When a subset S ⊆ N ∪ {0} of facilities places an order together, a joint setup cost is
incurred, which is denoted by K(S). Assume that
• K(∅) = 0, i.e., the joint setup cost should be zero when no facility places an order.
• K(A) ≤ K(B) for any A ⊆ B ⊆ N ∪ {0}, i.e., the joint setup cost does not decrease
when additional facilities are included in an order.
• K(A ∪ B) +K(A ∩ B) ≤ K(A) +K(B) for any A,B ⊆ N ∪ {0}. It means that K()
is a submodular function, or equivalently, K(A ∪ {i})−K(A) ≥ K(B ∪ {i})−K(B)
if A ⊆ B and i /∈ A. This property reflects general economies of scale.
We restrict ourselves to stationary inventory policies, which can be characterized by an
(N + 1)-tuple, (T0, Ti : i ∈ N), where T0 is the replenishment interval at the warehouse and
Ti is that at retailer i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . That is, facility i ∈ N ∪ {0} orders at times
0, Ti, 2Ti, · · · . In the so-called power-of-two policy, we require that
Ti = 2
miL, ∀i ∈ N ∪ {0}
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for some L > 0, where mi is an integer and can be negative. Here L is called the base
planning period.
For an arbitrarily chosen base planning period L, it is known from Federgruen et al. [6]
that the optimal power-of-two policy yields an average cost that is at most 6% higher than
the optimal cost, and thus is 94% effective. By choosing the best L, the optimal power-of-two
policy is 98% effective.
Now we consider the cost allocation problem for this joint replenishment model. We
model this problem as a cooperative game denoted by (N, VΓ). Here N is called the grand
coalition of n retailers. Any subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition. Γ is the set of all possible
values that the replenishment interval Ti can take, i ∈ N∪{0}, i.e., Γ is the set of permissible
policies for every facility in N ∪{0}. If a power-of-two policy with a base planning period L
is used, then Γ is denoted by ΓL, i.e.,
ΓL = {t : t > 0 and t = 2mL for some m ∈ Z}.
VΓ is the cost characteristic function defined for every subset of N , with Γ being the set of
permissible policies of every facility in N ∪{0}. In particular, VΓ(∅) = 0 and for ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
VΓ(S) is the optimal long-run average cost for the retailers in S.
The game (N, VΓ) is called a concave game if for every pair of subsets S, T ⊆ N ,
VΓ(S) + VΓ(T ) ≥ VΓ(S ∪ T ) + VΓ(S ∩ T ), i.e., the set function VΓ(·) is submodular.
A vector l = (l1, l2, · · · , lN) is called an allocation for the game (N, VΓ) if
∑
j∈N lj =
VΓ(N). The core of a cooperative game is a solution concept which requires that no subset
of players has an incentive to secede.
Definition 1. An allocation l is in the core of the game (N, V ), if
∑
j∈N lj = VΓ(N) and∑
j∈S
lj ≤ VΓ(S)
for any subset S ⊆ N .
An allocation l is called an ²-approximate core allocation if for each subset S ⊆ N ,∑
j∈S lj ≤ (1 + ²)VΓ(S) for some ² ≥ 0.
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We now characterize the function VΓL(S) for each S ⊆ N . Let s = |S| and TS = (T0, Ti :
i ∈ S). First,
VΓL(S) := min gS(TS) + hS(TS)
s.t. TS ∈ Γs+1L ,
(1)
where Γs+1L = {t = (t1, t2, · · · , ts+1) : ti ∈ ΓL, i = 1, 2, · · · , s + 1}. In this formulation,
gS(TS) and hS(TS) are the system-wide average setup cost and inventory holding cost per
unit time, respectively.
It is well-known from Roundy [18] that
hS(TS) =
∑
i∈S
(HiTi +H
w
i max{T0 − Ti, 0}) .
We follow Federgruen et al. [6] to express gS(TS). For a given power-of-two policy specified
by TS, let pi = (pi0, pi1, · · · , pis) be a permutation of S ∪ {0} such that
Tpi0 ≤ Tpi1 ≤ · · · ≤ Tpis ,
i.e., in this permutation, the replenishment intervals are nondecreasing, and the reorder fre-
quencies are nonincreasing. Observe that, under this power-of-two policy, whenever facility
pii is replenished, all the facilities in {pi0, · · · , pii−1} are replenished at the same time. There-
fore, at most one of the following s+1 sets of facilities places an order at any replenishment
epoch:
{pi0}, {pi0, pi1}, {pi0, pi1, pi2}, · · · , {pi0, pi1, · · · , pis}.
Furthermore, the order frequency of the set {pi0, pi1, · · · , pii} is
1
Tpii
− 1
Tpii+1
,
where 1/Tpis+1 is defined to be zero. It follows that,
gS(TS) =
s∑
i=0
K({pi0, · · · , pii})( 1
Tpii
− 1
Tpii+1
)
=
s∑
i=0
1
Tpii
(K({pi0, · · · , pii−1, pii})−K({pi0, · · · , pii−1})) .
Now we define
ΦS = {k ∈ Rs+1 : k ≥ 0, and
∑
i∈A
ki ≤ K(A),∀A ⊆ S ∪ {0}}.
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From a well-known fact (see the definition of polymatroids and Lemma 1 in the online
companion), we conclude that gS(TS) is the optimal value of the following linear program
max
s∑
i=0
1
Ti
ki
s.t. k ∈ ΦS.
(2)
Therefore, problem (1) is equivalent to
VΓL(S) := min
TS∈Γs+1L
max
k∈ΦS
k0
T0
+
∑
i∈S
(
ki
Ti
+HiTi +H
w
i max{T0 − Ti, 0}
)
. (3)
Remark. In the cooperative game stated above, the cost function VΓL(S) is defined
for a given base planning period L, which is independent of S. That is, all coalitions are
required to use a common base planning period. This assumption is also made in Anily and
Haviv [1]. Let (N, VΓpot) denote the game in which each coalition is allowed to choose its best
base planning period. On the one hand, it can be easily shown that the game (N, VΓpot) (as
well as the one studied in [1]) may have an empty core. We provide an example in Section
5. On the other hand, any core allocation of the game (N, VΓL) should be a 6%-approximate
core allocation for the game (N, VΓpot). In the remainder of this paper, we focus on the game
(N, VΓL).
3 Duality Results
In this section, we develop a Lagrangian dual for problem (3). We also prove a strong duality
result concerning problem (3) and its Lagrangian dual. Notice that problem (3) is defined
for any subset S ⊆ N .
For a given TS, the dual of the linear program (2) is
minα
∑
A⊆S∪{0}
αAK(A)
s.t.
∑
A⊆S∪{0}:i∈A
αA ≥ 1
Ti
∀i ∈ S ∪ {0}
α ≥ 0,
(4)
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where α = (αA : A ⊆ S ∪ {0}). Therefore, we have
VΓL(S) = minα,TS
∑
A⊆S∪{0}
αAK(A) +
∑
i∈S
(HiTi +H
w
i max{T0 − Ti, 0})
s.t.
∑
A⊆S∪{0}:i∈A
αA ≥ 1
Ti
∀i ∈ S ∪ {0}
α ≥ 0
TS ∈ Γs+1L .
We now consider a related problem where the set ΓL is replaced by a more general set Γ:
VΓ(S) = minα,z,TS
∑
A⊆S∪{0}
αAK(A) +
∑
i∈S
(HiTi +H
w
i zi)
s.t.
∑
A⊆S∪{0}:i∈A
αA ≥ 1
Ti
∀i ∈ S ∪ {0}
zi ≥ T0 − Ti ∀i ∈ S
α ≥ 0
z ≥ 0
TS ∈ Γs+1,
(5)
where z = (zi : i ∈ S) and Γs+1 = {t = (t1, t2, · · · , ts+1) : ti ∈ Γ, i = 1, 2, · · · , s + 1}.
Notice that if Γ = ΓL, then the two optimization problems above are equivalent. Problem
(5) is a non-convex minimization problem if the set Γ is not convex.
Now consider a Lagrangian function related to problem (5). For each k ∈ Rs+1+ and
u ∈ Rs+, define
L(α,TS, z;u, k)
=
∑
A⊆S∪{0}
αAK(A) +
∑
i∈S
(HiTi +H
w
i zi)−
∑
i∈S∪{0}
ki(
∑
A⊆S∪{0}:i∈A
αA − 1
Ti
)−
∑
i∈S
ui(zi − T0 + Ti)
=
∑
A⊆S∪{0}
(K(A)−
∑
i∈A
ki)αA +
k0
T0
+
(∑
i∈S
ui
)
T0 +
∑
i∈S
(
(Hi − ui)Ti + ki
Ti
)
+
∑
i∈S
(Hwi − ui)zi
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Therefore, for fixed u ≥ 0 and k ≥ 0,
min
α≥0,z≥0,TS∈Γs+1
L(α,TS, z; u, k)
=

min
TS∈Γs+1
k0
T0
+
(∑
i∈S
ui
)
T0 +
∑
i∈S
(
(Hi − ui)Ti + ki
Ti
)
,
if ui ≤ Hwi ∀ i ∈ S and K(A) ≥
∑
i∈A ki ∀ A ⊆ S ∪ {0};
−∞, otherwise.
It follows that the Lagrangian dual of (5) is
max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
min
TS∈Γs+1
k0
T0
+
(∑
i∈S
ui
)
T0 +
∑
i∈S
(
(Hi − ui)Ti + ki
Ti
)
. (6)
It turns out that the dual variables (u, k) have interesting interpretations. It is clear
that, for given (u, k), the dual problem is completely separable, i.e., each facility just solves
an EOQ problem with the power-of-two restriction. Then the variable k shows how the
submodular joint setup cost should be divided among the retailers and the warehouse: ki for
retailer i ≥ 1 and k0 for the warehouse. Further, for each retailer i, the variable ui indicates
the inventory holding cost saved by operating a warehouse. In the EOQ problem for retailer
i, the (modified) inventory holding cost per unit inventory per unit time (multiplied by the
corresponding demand) becomes (Hi− ui). On the other hand, in the EOQ problem for the
warehouse, the (modified) inventory holding cost per unit inventory per unit time (multiplied
by the corresponding demand) is
∑
i∈S ui. These interpretations of the dual and the dual
variables are particularly useful in defining core-allocations for the joint replenishment game.
It is helpful to consider an optimization problem that is closely related to problem (6):
min
TS∈Γs+1
max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
k0
T0
+
(∑
i∈S
ui
)
T0 +
∑
i∈S
(
(Hi − ui)Ti + ki
Ti
)
. (7)
For simplicity, define
fS(TS;u, k) =
k0
T0
+
(∑
i∈S
ui
)
T0 +
∑
i∈S
(
(Hi − ui)Ti + ki
Ti
)
.
The following observation is straightforward.
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Lemma 1. For any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
VΓ(S) = min
TS∈Γs+1
max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
fS(TS;u, k).
Proof. Recall that
VΓ(S) = min
TS∈Γs+1
max
k∈ΦS
k0
T0
+
∑
i∈S
(
ki
Ti
+HiTi +H
w
i max{T0 − Ti, 0}
)
.
Therefore, the lemma follows by noticing that∑
i∈S
(T0 − Ti)ui,
as a function of u : 0 ≤ ui ≤ Hwi , is maximized when
ui =
{
Hwi , if T0 > Ti
0, if T0 < Ti,
and the corresponding maximum value is
∑
i∈S H
w
i max{T0 − Ti, 0}. ¤
Lemma 1 shows that problem (7) and problem (5) have the same optimal objective
value, which is equal to VΓ(S).
Our goal is to show that (7) and (6) have the same optimal objective value when Γ = ΓL.
Such results usually do not hold as the set ΓL is not convex. In order to establish our results,
we first consider an easier case where Γ = R+, which is a convex set. The following lemma
is an immediate consequence of standard strong duality results in convex optimization.
Lemma 2. For any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
VR+(S) = max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
min
TS∈Rs+1+
fS(TS; u, k).
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the objective function of the minimization problem
(5) is convex in (TS, α, z). Recall that α = (αA : A ⊆ S ∪ {0}) and z = (zi : i ∈ S).
Furthermore, the feasible set is convex when Γ = R+, and there exists a feasible solution
(TS, α, z) such that all the constraints of (5) are satisfied as strict inequalities. Therefore,
from Lemma 4 in the online companion, Lemma 2 follows. ¤
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Now let T∗S = (T ∗0 , T ∗i : i ∈ S) be an optimal solution to
min
TS∈Rs+1+
max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
fS(TS;u, k)
and let (u∗, k∗) be an optimal solution to
max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
min
TS∈Rs+1+
fS(TS;u, k).
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we know these two optimization problems have the same optimal
objective value. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 5 in the online companion that
(u∗, k∗) ∈ arg max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
fS(T∗S;u, k) (8)
and
T∗S ∈ arg min
TS∈Rs+1+
fS(TS;u∗, k∗). (9)
From (8) and (9), we have
u∗i =
{
Hwi , if T
∗
0 > T
∗
i
0, if T ∗0 < T
∗
i ,
(10)
k∗ ∈ argmax
k∈ΦS
∑
i∈S∪{0}
ki
T ∗i
, (11)
T ∗0 ∈ arg min
T0≥0
k∗0
T0
+ (
∑
i∈S
u∗i )T0, (12)
and
T ∗i ∈ argmin
Ti≥0
(
k∗i
Ti
+ (Hi − u∗i )Ti
)
∀i ∈ S. (13)
Now we are ready to prove the strong duality result concerning problem (5) and its
Lagrangian dual (6) when Γ = ΓL.
Lemma 3. For any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
VΓL(S) = max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
min
TS∈Γs+1L
fS(TS;u, k)
Proof. Recall that the base planning period L is given in the definition of ΓL. Assuming
that T∗S is given in (9), we define T˜S = (T˜0, T˜i : i ∈ S) as follows. For each i ∈ S ∪ {0}, let
mi be the unique integer such that
2mi−1/2L ≤ T ∗i < 2mi+1/2L,
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and let
T˜i = 2
miL.
By the definition of T˜S, we know that
T˜0 ∈ arg min
T0∈ΓL
k∗0
T0
+ (
∑
i∈S
u∗i )T0, (14)
and
T˜i ∈ arg min
Ti∈ΓL
(
k∗i
Ti
+ (Hi − u∗i )Ti
)
∀i ∈ S. (15)
Further, for any i, j ∈ S ∪ {0}, if T ∗i ≥ T ∗j , then T˜i ≥ T˜j; if T˜i > T˜j, then T ∗i > T ∗j . Thus, it
follows from Lemma 3 in the online companion that
u∗i =
{
Hwi , if T˜0 > T˜i
0, if T˜0 < T˜i,
k∗ ∈ argmax
k∈ΦS
∑
i∈S∪{0}
ki
T˜i
.
Therefore,
(u∗, k∗) ∈ arg max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
fS(T˜S;u, k), (16)
and
T˜S ∈ arg min
TS∈Γs+1L
fS(TS;u∗, k∗), (17)
which in turn implies, in view of Lemma 5 in the online companion, that
min
TS∈Γs+1L
max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
fS(TS;u, k) = max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
min
TS∈Γs+1L
fS(TS; u, k).
The proof is complete. ¤
From our interpretation of the Lagrangian dual (6) of problem (5) and the dual variables,
Lemma 3 shows that the one-warehouse multiple retailer problem under power-of-two policies
is indeed separable by carefully defining cost parameters for the warehouse and the retailers.
The cost parameters can be determined by an optimal dual solution (u, k).
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4 Core Allocations
In this section, we propose an allocation to the joint replenishment game (N, VΓL). We start
by solving the grand dual problem of problem (3):
VΓL(N) = max
k∈ΦN ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈N
min
TN∈Γn+1L
fN(TN ;u, k). (18)
Assume that (uˆN , kˆN) is an optimal solution to the grand dual problem. Further, assume
that (u∗N , k
∗
N) is an optimal solution to the convex relaxation of problem (18)
max
k∈ΦN ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈N
min
TN∈Rn+1+
fN(TN ;u, k).
From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that (u∗N , k
∗
N) is also optimal to problem (18) (the
maximization problem). Therefore, from now on, we assume (uˆN , kˆN) = (u
∗
N , k
∗
N).
Recall the definition of fN(TN ; u, k). Given (uˆN , kˆN), fN(TN ; uˆN , kˆN) consists of the
cost incurred at the warehouse and at each of the retailers. Intuitively, the cost incurred
at retailer i should be allocated to retailer i itself. The rest of the section is devoted to
allocating the cost incurred at the warehouse to the retailers.
To that end, for each S ⊆ N , define
γ(S) = min
T0∈ΓL
(
kˆ0
T0
+ (
∑
i∈S
uˆi)T0
)
.
The value of γ(∅) is set equal to zero. Notice that γ(N) is the total cost incurred at the
warehouse.
Now we are ready to prove our key result.
Theorem 1. Assume that a vector (θi : i ∈ N) satisfies∑
i∈N
θi = γ(N) (19)
and ∑
i∈S
θi ≤ γ(S) ∀S ⊆ N. (20)
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Then the allocation (βi : i ∈ N) defined by
βi = θi + min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
(21)
is in the core of the joint replenishment game (N, VΓL).
Proof. From the definition of (βi : i ∈ N), it is clear that,
∑
i∈N
βi =
∑
i∈N
(
θi + min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti)
)
= γ(N) +
∑
i∈N
min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
= min
TN∈Γn+1L
kˆ0
T0
+ (
∑
i∈N
uˆi)T0 +
∑
i∈N
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
= max
k∈ΦN ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈N
min
TN∈Γn+1L
fN(TN ;u, k)
= VΓL(N),
where the first equality holds by the definition of βi, the second holds because of assumption
(19), the third holds because of the separability of the minimization problem, and the fourth
holds by the definition of (uˆN , kˆN).
Now, for any S ⊆ N , we have
∑
i∈S
βi =
∑
i∈S
(
θi + min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti)
)
≤ γ(S) +
∑
i∈S
min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
= min
TS∈Γs+1L
kˆ0
T0
+ (
∑
i∈S
uˆi)T0 +
∑
i∈S
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
≤ max
k∈ΦS ,0≤ui≤Hwi :i∈S
min
TS∈Γs+1L
fS(TS; u, k)
= VΓL(S),
where the first inequality holds because of assumption (20), and the second inequality holds
because if kˆN ∈ ΦN then (kˆ0, kˆi : i ∈ S) ∈ ΦS. ¤
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The core allocation (βi : i ∈ N) defined by (21) consists of two parts. From conditions
(19) and (20), the first part (θi : i ∈ N) defines a (stable) allocation of the total average cost
incurred at the warehouse, where the setup cost is kˆ0 per order and the inventory holding
cost is
∑
i∈S uˆi per unit inventory and per unit time. The second term in the allocation is
the average total cost for each individual retailer i, where the setup cost is kˆi per order and
the inventory holding cost is (Hi − uˆi) per unit inventory and per unit time.
Recall that uˆi = u
∗
i . From (10), it follows that if Tˆi > Tˆ0 (and thus T
∗
i > T
∗
0 ), then
uˆi = u
∗
i = 0. The implication is that, if in the optimal solution retailer i orders less often than
the warehouse, then the warehouse does not help retailer i reduce its inventory holding cost.
In this case, the (modified) inventory holding cost (multiplied by the corresponding demand)
per unit time is Hi− uˆi = Hi. Also, the (modified) inventory holding cost (multiplied by the
corresponding demand) per unit time, i.e.,
∑
i∈N uˆi does not include the contribution from
retailer i as uˆi = 0. Therefore, it seems natural that retailer i should not share the holding
cost incurred at the warehouse. This observation is useful in motivating our proposed cost
allocation scheme.
Notice that once (uˆN , kˆN) = (u
∗
N , k
∗
N) is known, the minimization problem
min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
can be easily solved for each i ∈ N . Therefore, from (21), in order to find a core allocation
(βi : i ∈ N), we only need to find a vector (θi : i ∈ N) that satisfies conditions (19) and (20).
In the remaining part of this section, we show how this can be done.
Consider an arbitrary permutation (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin) of (1, 2, · · · , n). We define Api0 = ∅,
and for each i ∈ N , Apii = {pi1, pi2, · · · , pii}.
Then, for each i ∈ N , let
θ∗pii = γ(A
pi
i )− γ(Apii−1). (22)
We shall show that (θ∗pii : i ∈ N) satisfies both (19) and (20) for any permutation (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin).
It is clear that (19) holds for (θ∗pii : i ∈ N). In order to verify condition (20), we first make a
simple observation.
Lemma 4. The set function γ(·) is submodular.
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Proof. Consider any two sets A ⊆ N and B ⊆ N with non-empty intersection. Assume that
there exists TA0 ∈ ΓL and TB0 ∈ ΓL such that
γ(A) =
kˆ0
TA0
+
(∑
i∈A
uˆi
)
TA0
and
γ(B) =
kˆ0
TB0
+
(∑
i∈B
uˆi
)
TB0 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that TA0 ≥ TB0 . If we define TA∪B0 = TB0 ∈ ΓL and
TA∩B0 = T
A
0 ∈ ΓL, then
kˆ0
TA∪B0
+
( ∑
i∈A∪B
uˆi
)
TA∪B0 =
kˆ0
TB0
+
 ∑
i∈A\B
uˆi
TB0 +
(∑
i∈B
uˆi
)
TB0
and
kˆ0
TA∩B0
+
( ∑
i∈A∩B
uˆi
)
TA∩B0 =
kˆ0
TA0
+
( ∑
i∈A∩B
uˆi
)
TA0 .
Therefore,
(γ(A ∪B) + γ(A ∩B))− (γ(A) + γ(B))
≤
(
kˆ0
TA∪B0
+
( ∑
i∈A∪B
uˆi
)
TA∪B0 +
kˆ0
TA∩B0
+
( ∑
i∈A∩B
uˆi
)
TA∩B0
)
−(
kˆ0
TA0
+
(∑
i∈A
uˆi
)
TA0 +
kˆ0
TB0
+
(∑
i∈B
uˆi
)
TB0
)
=
 ∑
i∈A\B
uˆi
 (TB0 − TA0 )
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that uˆi ≥ 0 and TB0 ≤ TA0 . This completes
the proof. ¤
Assumption (20) follows directly from Lemma 4, which is summarized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.
∑
pii∈S θ
∗
pii
≤ γ(S) holds for any S ⊆ N and for any permutation (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin).
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Proof. We have, by the submodularity of γ(·), that
γ(S ∩ Apii ) + γ(Apii−1) ≥ γ(S ∩ Apii−1) + γ((S ∩ Apii ) ∪ Apii−1) = γ(S ∩ Apii−1) + γ(Apii )
for any S ⊆ N with pii ∈ S. Thus,
γ(Apii )− γ(Apii−1) ≤ γ(S ∩ Apii )− γ(S ∩ Apii−1),
which immediately implies that∑
pii∈S
(
γ(Apii )− γ(Apii−1)
) ≤∑
pii∈S
(
γ(S ∩ Apii )− γ(S ∩ Apii−1)
)
= γ(S).
The lemma follows from the definition of θ∗pii . ¤
Now we arrive at the main result of this section.
Corollary 1. For the joint replenishment game (N, VΓL), the allocation (βi : i ∈ N) defined
by
βi = γ(A
pi
i )− γ(Apii−1) + min
Ti∈ΓL
(
kˆi
Ti
+ (Hi − uˆi)Ti
)
(23)
is in the core for any permutation (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin).
Notice that Corollary 1 defines a class of core-allocations. A particular allocation can
be defined by choosing an arbitrary permutation (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin). It should also be clear
that any convex combination of such allocations is in the core as well. An implication of this
observation is that there are infinitely many core-allocations (under very minor conditions).
This fact has been proved rigorously by Anily and Haviv [1] for a special class of the game
that will be discussed in the next section.
5 Special Cases
In this section, we consider two special cases of the general model. In the first case, the joint
setup cost is additive, and the second case is the one studied by Anily and Haviv [1].
19
5.1 Additive Setup Cost
We consider a special case of the game (N, VΓL) in which the submodular joint setup cost is
additive, i.e.,
K(R) =
∑
i∈R
Ki ∀∅ 6= R ⊆ N ∪ {0},
where K0 is the setup cost of the warehouse and Ki is the setup cost of retailer i.
In this case, we denote the corresponding joint replenishment game as (N, VAΓL) where
the characteristic cost function VAΓL(S) is defined as follows, for each S ⊆ N :
VAΓL(S) := min
TS∈Γs+1L
(
K0
T0
+
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+HiTi +H
w
i max(T0 − Ti, 0)
))
. (24)
We show that the game (N, VAΓL) is concave, i.e., the function VAΓL(·) is submodular. This
fact has been proved by Teo and Shu [23], in the context of supply chain network design, for
the case when T0 and Ti are only required to be non-negative real numbers, i.e., when the
power-of-two restriction is relaxed. Nonetheless, our proof and presentation follow closely
that in [23].
Theorem 2. The game (N, VAΓL) is concave.
Proof. Consider any two sets A ⊆ N and B ⊆ N with non-empty intersection. Assume that
there exist TA ∈ Γ|A|+1L and TB ∈ Γ|B|+1L such that
VAΓL(A) =
K0
TA0
+
∑
i∈A
(
Ki
TAi
+HiT
A
i +H
w
i max(T
A
0 − TAi , 0)
)
and
VAΓL(B) =
K0
TB0
+
∑
i∈B
(
Ki
TBi
+HiT
B
i +H
w
i max(T
B
0 − TBi , 0)
)
.
We assume without loss of generality that TA0 ≥ TB0 .
Then we define feasible solutions to problem (24) for S = A ∪ B and S = A ∩ B,
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respectively as follows.
TA∪B0 = T
B
0 ∈ ΓL
TA∪Bi =
{
TAi ∈ ΓL, if i ∈ A \B
TBi ∈ ΓL, if i ∈ B
TA∩B0 = T
A
0 ∈ ΓL
TA∩Bi = T
A
i ∈ ΓL.
It follows that
VAΓL(A ∪B) ≤
K0
TB0
+
∑
i∈A\B
(
Ki
TAi
+HiT
A
i +H
w
i max(T
B
0 − TAi , 0)
)
+
∑
i∈B
(
Ki
TBi
+HiT
B
i +H
w
i max(T
B
0 − TBi , 0)
)
and
VAΓL(A ∩B) ≤
(
K0
TA0
+
∑
i∈A∩B
(
Ki
TAi
+HiT
A
i +H
w
i max(T
A
0 − TAi , 0)
))
.
Therefore,
(VAΓL(A ∪B) + VAΓL(A ∩B))− (VAΓL(A) + VAΓL(B))
=
∑
i∈A\B
Hwi max(T
B
0 − TAi , 0)−
∑
i∈A\B
Hwi max(T
A
0 − TAi , 0)
≤ 0
where the last inequality holds because of the assumption TA0 ≥ TB0 . Thus, VAΓL(·) is
submodular and the game (N, VAΓL) is concave. ¤
It is well-known that the core of a concave game is always non-empty. Therefore,
Theorem 2 provides an alternative proof to the non-emptiness of the core when the joint
setup cost is additive.
5.2 Joint Replenishment Game with First Order Interaction
Now we consider the game proposed and studied by Anily and Haviv [1]. In this case,
the warehouse does not hold any inventory and does not place any order. For any subset
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∅ 6= S ⊆ N of retailers, the joint setup cost is defined as
K(S) = K0 +
∑
i∈S
Ki
where K0 is called the major setup cost that is independent of set S, and Ki is called the
minor setup cost associated with retailer i. Notice that 0 /∈ S.
Under this assumption, Anily and Haviv [1] proposed a cooperative game (N, VFΓL)
where the characteristic function VFΓL(S) is defined as follows, for each S ⊆ N :
VFΓL(S) = minTi:i∈S
K0
mini∈S Ti
+
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+HiTi
)
s.t. Ti ∈ ΓL ∀i ∈ S,
or equivalently
VFΓL(S) = minτ,Ti:i∈S
K0
τ
+
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+HiTi
)
s.t. Ti ≥ τ ∀i ∈ S
τ, Ti ∈ ΓL ∀i ∈ S.
(25)
Of course, the game (N, VFΓL) is a special case of the game (N, VΓL). Therefore, we
may apply the duality result (Lemma 2) to study the game (N, VFΓL). However, given the
special structure of VFΓL(S), it is possible to derive a much simpler dual formulation. In
particular, in the dual formulation in Lemma 2, we have the dual variables (k0, ki : i ∈ S) in
addition to (ui : i ∈ S), where ki can be interpreted as the allocation of the joint setup cost.
In this subsection, we derive a dual for problem (25), where the dual variables (k0, ki : i ∈ S)
are not necessary. This new dual formulation might be of interest on its own, as it is much
easier to analyze. In fact, we show that the dual formulation admits a closed form solution.
For each λ = (λi : i ∈ S) ≥ 0, the Lagrangian function of problem (25) is
K0
τ
+
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+HiTi
)
−
∑
i∈S
λi(Ti − τ) = K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈S
λi)τ +
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λi)Ti
)
.
Therefore, the Lagrangian dual of (25) is
max
λi≥0:∀i∈S
min
τ,Ti∈ΓL:∀i∈S
K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈S
λi)τ +
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λi)Ti
)
. (26)
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Following a proof similar to that of Lemma 2, we can show that, for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
VFΓL(S) = max
λi≥0:∀i∈S
min
τ,Ti∈ΓL:∀i∈S
K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈S
λi)τ +
∑
i∈S
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λi)Ti
)
.
Notice that, from the Lagrangian duality result for convex optimization problems (see Lemma
??),
max
λi≥0:∀i∈N
min
τ,Ti≥0:∀i∈N
K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈N
λi)τ +
∑
i∈N
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λi)Ti
)
(27)
= min
τ,Ti≥0:∀i∈N
max
λi≥0:∀i∈N
K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈N
λi)τ +
∑
i∈N
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λi)Ti
)
(28)
= min
Ti≥0:∀i∈N
K0
mini∈N Ti
+
∑
i∈N
(
Ki
Ti
+HiTi
)
. (29)
Assume that (λ∗i : i ∈ N) is an optimal solution to problem (27), and (τ ∗, T ∗i : i ∈ N) is
an optimal solution to problem (28). Then (T ∗i : i ∈ N) is also optimal to problem (29).
Therefore, (T ∗i : i ∈ N) can be easily computed as follows.
Assume that the retailers in N are ordered in such a way that
K1
H1
≤ K2
H2
≤ · · · ≤ Kn
Hn
.
Let
i∗(N) = max{j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that K0 +
∑
1≤i≤j Ki∑
1≤i≤j Hi
≥ Kj
Hj
}
and let N0 = {1, · · · , i∗(N)}, which is called the minimum set of N . Then, from [1], we have
T ∗i =

τ ∗ =
√
K0 +
∑
j∈N0 Kj∑
j∈N0 Hj
if i ∈ N0√
Ki
Hi
, otherwise.
By definition,
T ∗i ∈ argmin
Ti≥0
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λ∗i )Ti
)
.
Therefore, it should be clear that
λ∗i =
 0 if i /∈ N
0
Hi − Ki
(τ ∗)2
> 0 otherwise.
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As in Lemma 2, (λ∗i : i ∈ N) should be optimal to the grand dual problem
VFΓL(N) = max
λi≥0:∀i∈N
min
τ,Ti∈ΓL:∀i∈N
K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈N
λi)τ +
∑
i∈N
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λi)Ti.
)
.
To some extent, the first part of VFΓL(N) corresponds to the cost incurred because of the
presence of the major setup cost. We have to allocate this cost to the retailers. Then we
define, for each S ⊆ N ,
φ(S) = min
τ∈ΓL
K0
τ
+ (
∑
i∈S
λ∗i )τ.
Following the proof of Corollary 1, we can show that, for every permutation (pi1, pi2, · · · , pin),
the allocation (βi : i ∈ N) defined by
βpii = φ({pi1, · · · , pii})− φ({pi1, · · · , pii−1}) + min
Ti∈ΓL
(
Ki
Ti
+ (Hi − λ∗i )Ti
)
is in the core of the game (N, VFΓL).
One interesting observation is that, for pii /∈ N0, λ∗pii = 0, and thus
φ({pi1, · · · , pii})− φ({pi1, · · · , pii−1}) = 0,
which further implies that
βpii = min
Ti∈Γ
(
Ki
Ti
+HiTi
)
.
The implication is that the retailers not in N0 do not pay anything towards the major setup
cost. This is consistent with the core-allocation suggested by Anily and Haviv [1].
To conclude this subsection, we consider the corresponding game in which each coalition
can choose its best base planning period. Consider an example with two retailers where the
major setup cost is very small compared to the minor setup costs and thus can be assumed
to be zero. In this case, if each retailer can optimize its base planning period, then each of
them is solving an EOQ model without restrictions. Assume that the corresponding optimal
costs are V1 and V2, respectively. Also assume that the cost parameters are chosen so that
the optimal replenishment intervals of these two retailers are not power-of-two multipliers of
one another. Then for the grand coalition with two retailers, when power-of-two policies are
applied, the optimal cost shall be strictly higher than V1 + V2. Therefore, the core for this
two-player game is empty.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the cost allocation problem for joint replenishment models. We prove
that the associated cooperative game has a non-empty core. The game generalizes the one
proposed by Anily and Haviv [1] to the case when the warehouse is allowed to hold inventory
and the setup cost is a general submodular function of the sets of facilities that place joint
orders.
The two special cases studied in Section 5 are both concave games. An immediate
question is whether the general case is also concave. The answer to this question would be
of interest as concave games have some interesting properties. Also, in the core-allocations
proposed in [1] as well as in the current paper, there could be free riders; that is, some
retailers do not share the major setup cost. Although the allocation is still stable because
it is in the core, it may be considered unfair by some retailers. One way to overcome this
shortcoming is to study other solution concepts in cooperative game theory. The Shapley
value might be a good choice because it is in the core of this game, and under this allocation,
it seems that every retailer has to share the major setup cost. However, the Shapley value
could be difficult to compute as it involves the summation of exponentially many numbers.
An interesting question in this direction is whether the Shapley value can be computed in
polynomial time (in the number of retailers) by taking advantage of the special structure of
the game.
Finally, this paper, together with [3] and [4], demonstrate the power of duality ap-
proaches in analyzing cooperative inventory games. We expect that these approaches will
find more applications in such settings.
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